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ABSTRACT 
 
Can You Trust the Good Guys? 
Trust Within and Between Groups with Different Missions 
 
NGOs and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves 
with their missions. We study whether these “good guys” are more trustworthy and how such 
pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and toward out-
groups. We find that subjects who strongly identify themselves with a non-profit mission are 
more trustworthy in a minimal group setting but also harshly discriminate against out-groups 
when subjects are grouped by the missions they identify themselves with. 
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1 Introduction
Organizations have diﬀerent missions. Particularly salient are missions in non-proﬁt orga-
nizations who derive their raison d’eˆtre from their particular non-proﬁt goals. In this study
we analyze eﬀects of such group identities on behavior directed toward in-group members
and toward out-groups.
Several studies suggest that some workers strongly care about non-proﬁt missions (e.g.,
Besley and Ghatak 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007). In a lab experiment, Fehrler and
Kosfeld (2012) ﬁnd that roughly one third of the subjects forgo a higher wage and choose
instead a contract under which they can generate a donation to a non-governmental or-
ganization (NGO). Sorting of types with diﬀerent social preferences and the consequences
for organizations have also been discussed in recent theoretical papers (e.g., Brekke and
Nyborg 2010, Kosfeld and von Siemens 2011). Empirically Brekke, Hauge, Lind, and Ny-
borg (2011) show that sorting into groups with and without a non-proﬁt mission leads to
more cooperation within the ﬁrst type of group in a public goods game, suggesting that
sorting leads to groups with diﬀerent social preferences (see also Lazear, Malmendier, and
Weber 2012).
Another potentially important issue in this context, group identity, has, however, not
received much attention. In-group favoritism and out-group discrimination are well known
phenomena in social psychology. Even minimal group identities, induced by randomly la-
beling groups, can lead to intergroup discrimination.1 In recent years, also economists have
begun to study the eﬀects of group identities on social behavior (e.g., Charness, Rigotti,
and Rustichini 2007, Ben-Ner, McCall, Stephane, and Wang 2009, Chen and Li 2009, Har-
greaves Heap and Zizzo 2009, Tsutsui and Zizzo 2012). If group identities are strong and
reﬂect diﬀerences in social preferences, stronger eﬀects might be expected than in a minimal
group setting.
We study trust and trustworthiness comparing treatments with groups with minimal
group identities and with groups with pro-social identities. Group identities are induced by
grouping participants according to their answers to two questions in a short questionnaire
that participants had to ﬁll in before the experiment. In the minimal group treatment
subjects are grouped according to the question if they like one of the painters Paul Klee or
Wassily Kandinski or if they like neither. In the mission treatment subjects are grouped
according to the question if they identify themselves strongly with the goals of one of the
NGOs, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) or Amnesty International (AI), or none of them.
We ﬁnd that subjects who identify themselves strongly with an NGO (the “good guys”)
are signiﬁcantly more trustworthy. This suggests that attracting such employees could have
advantages for an organization beyond pure motivation eﬀects. However, these subjects also
strongly discriminate between the types of trustors and transfer back substantially more
1One of the earliest studies in this context is Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971). See Brewer
(1979) and Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) for reviews of the early literature.
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to trustors who also identify themselves with an NGO. The comparison with the minimal
group treatment shows that the diﬀerence in the back transfers toward in- and out-groups is
completely driven by negative discrimination of the out-group. These ﬁndings suggest that
mismatches between worker and leadership missions or between the missions of diﬀerent
organizations could be detrimental for cooperation inside and between organizations.2
2 Experimental Design
In the beginning, before receiving instructions for the trust game, subjects are asked to ﬁll
in a short questionnaire on their computer screens. The questionnaire includes questions
like “Do you do sports?”, “Do you play an instrument?”, and the question “Do you strongly
identify yourself with the goals of one of the NGOs, Amnesty International or the WWF?”.
The last question is the one we use in our mission treatment. It has the following answer
options: “WWF”, “Amnesty International” and “None of the two”. One option has to
be checked and multiple answers are ruled out. In the minimal group treatment, we use
a diﬀerent question from the same questionnaire to form groups: “Do you like one of the
painters: Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinski?” with answer options, “Klee”, “Kandinsky” and
“None of the two”. With this treatment we relate to the classic social psychology study in
this ﬁeld by Tajfel et al. (1971) in which preferences about Klee and Kandinski are used
as well to form “minimal” groups. The questionnaire is designed to give the subjects the
impression that they take part in a small socioeconomic survey to make it unlikely that they
expect that their answers play a role in the experiment.
After reading the instructions and a short comprehension quiz, subjects play a trust
game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995) in which transfer choices are limited to 4 options.
Half of the subjects are trustors the other half trustees. All recipients receive an initial
endowment of 12 points. Trustors can transfer 0, 4, 8 or 12 points to the trustee. The
transfers are tripled. The trustees can then send back any integer amount of points from the
points they dispose of back to the trustor.
Trustors and trustees can make their transfer decision in the investment game conditional
on the type of the recipient, i.e., on the answer of their partner to the NGO question in the
mission treatment and on the answer to the art question in the minimal group treatment.
The strategy method is used. Trustors make three transfer decisions, one for each potential
type of trustee. Trustees make twelve decisions, one for every possible type of trustor and
received transfer.3 In addition to the transfer decisions, we ask the trustors about their
2The related problem of worker-leadership mission mismatches for worker motivation is discussed in Besley
and Ghatak (2005).
3The use of the strategy method in an investment game has been shown to lead to lower trustworthiness as
compared to the “direct response” method (Casari and Cason 2009). In the context of this experiment, this
might lead to an attenuation of the eﬀect of group identity on trustworthiness. Having subjects make transfers
to the diﬀerent groups of recipients appears natural when the goal is to study whether they discriminate
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beliefs regarding back transfers for all possible transfer levels and types of trustees. The
answers to these questions have no inﬂuence on the pay-oﬀs. After the transfers are made
and the beliefs elicited, the experiment ends and the subjects are paid out.
One point in the trust game is worth CHF 0.8 (at the time of the experiment CHF 1 was
worth USD 0.9). Overall, 190 subjects (52% female) participated in the experiment in the
laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich.4 On average the
participants earned CHF 14.8 in addition to a show-up fee of CHF 10 and spent around 45
minutes in the lab.
3 Results
3.1 Trustor Behaviour
Figure 1 presents the expected back transfers from diﬀerent types of trustees, i.e., beliefs
about their trustworthiness. We see that trustors expect lower back transfers from subjects
who do not strongly identify themselves with the goals of either NGO (henceforth called
No-NGO types). Regressing expected back transfers from each group on the transfers (i.e.,
estimating linear ﬁts for the three groups in Fig. 1) results in statistically signiﬁcantly steeper
slopes for WWF and AI than for No-NGO (p<0.01, F-Test, Regression (1), Table 2).5
Moreover, we see that the beliefs about back transfers from AI and WWF types are
almost the same. Table 1 shows the transfer levels to the diﬀerent types of trustees from
the diﬀerent types of trustors. The diﬀerences between the transfer levels reﬂect the beliefs
about the back transfers. Even the No-NGO types transfer less to other No-NGO types than
to AI or WWF types. For the No-NGO types, the diﬀerences of the transfer levels to the
three trustee types are pairwise statistically diﬀerent (p<0.05, Wilcoxon rank sum test). For
the other two groups the transfer level to No-NGO types is statistically diﬀerent (p<0.05)
to the transfer to the other two groups which themselves are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
each other (p>0.1). Transfers to No-NGO types are lower than to any other group. The
NGO types receive, on average, 47% higher transfers than No-NGO types. The lower half of
Table 1 shows the transfer levels in the minimal group treatment. Here, each type of trustor
favors trustees with the same art preferences but there is no single group that is less trusted
than all the other groups.
3.2 Trustee Behavior
In the analysis of trustee behavior we start by looking at the trustworthiness of the diﬀerent
NGO types in the minimal group treatment where they cannot condition their back transfer
between these groups.
4The treatments were programmed with zTree (Fischbacher 2007).
5This ﬁnding holds for all types of trustors (see models (2)-(4) in Table 2).
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Figure 1: Beliefs about the trustworthiness of diﬀerent trustees
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Note: Expected back transfers from diﬀerent NGO types in the mission
treatment (and their 95% conﬁdence intervals).
Table 1: Transfer levels from members of each group to all diﬀerent trustees
Mission Treatment
to WWF to AI to No-NGO N
from WWF 8.3 (0.8) 7.9 (0.8) 4.6 (0.9) 28
from AI 7.1 (1.2) 8.3 (1.2) 4.6 (1.8) 14
from No-NGO 6.8 (0.7) 7.6 (0.7) 5.9 (0.8) 36
Minimal Group Treatment
to Klee to Kandinski to No-Artist N
from Klee 8.6 (1.0) 6.6 (1.1) 6.4 (1.1) 22
from Kandinski 7.6 (0.9) 8.8 (0.8) 6.7 (1.1) 19
from No-Artist 6.3 (1.0) 6.2 (1.0) 8.3 (0.9) 26
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
5
on the NGO type of the trustor. This allows us to see whether the NGO types are more
trustworthy when the group identity is unrelated to their NGO identiﬁcation. In the minimal
group treatment the transfers have to be conditioned on the art preferences of the trustor. As
we used the same questionnaire for both the minimal group and mission treatments, we can
group the results by the answers to the NGO question. Figure 2 presents the back transfers
averaged over the three potential recipient types (“Klee”, “Kandinski”, and “No-Artist”) for
all potential transfers.
Figure 2: Average back transfers of diﬀerent NGO types in the
minimal group treatment
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Note: The back transfers from the diﬀerent NGO groups are averaged over
the three recipient (artist) groups in the minimal group treatment. The
intervals displayed are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
We see that people who identify themselves with one of the NGOs are more trustworthy
than people who do not. Regressing back transfer on transfer gives signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
slopes for the AI group than for the No-NGO group (p<0.05, F-Test, Regression 5, Table
2).6 Pooling the AI and the WWF group in the regression gives a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent slope
of this combined NGO group to the No-NGO group slope (p<0.05, F-Test, Regression 6,
Table 2). The slope of the WWF group alone is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the slopes of
the No-NGO group (p>0.1, Regression 5, Table 2) and the AI group (p>0.1).
6In this and following regressions there are four observations from every trustor (one for each possible
transfer level). In the estimation of the standard errors these are, therefore, treated as one cluster each.
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Table 2: Regressions of expected back transfer and average back transfer on
transfers from diﬀerent groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WWF AI No NGO
dependent variable: expected back transfers in models (1)-(4)
and back transfers in (5)-(6)
wwf[0,1] 0.48∗ 0.73 0.91 0.12 -0.49
(0.23) (0.48) (0.57) (0.24) (0.26)
ai[0,1] 0.60∗ 0.52 1.31 0.38 0.43
(0.28) (0.46) (0.82) (0.39) (0.29)
no-ngo[0,1] 0.42 0.28 0.16 0.63 -0.25 -0.25
(0.24) (0.34) (0.21) (0.43) (0.20) (0.20)
ngo[0,1] -0.15
(0.21)
transfer×wwf 1.31∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.15)
transfer×ai 1.33∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.13) (0.22) (0.10) (0.17)
transfer×no-ngo 0.99∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
transfer×ngo 1.23∗∗∗
(0.12)
푁 936 336 168 432 268 268
푅2 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.70
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ 푝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 푝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 푝 < 0.001. In
models (1)-(2) expected back transfer is regressed on the group dummies of the
trustors and their transfers. Model (1) refers to Figure 1. In models (5) and (6) the
dependent variable is the average back transfer to the three artist types. Model (5)
refers to Figure 2. In model (6) both NGO groups are pooled.
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Figure 3: Trustworthiness of diﬀerent trustee groups towards diﬀerent
trustor groups
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Note: Each panel displays the coeﬃcients (and their 95% conﬁdence intervals) of
regressions of back transfers from a diﬀerent group of trustees on transfers from a
diﬀerent group of trustors. Full results from the regression models are reported in
Table 3.
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Next we study what happens if subjects are grouped by their NGO identiﬁcation. Fig-
ure 3, which shows the estimated coeﬃcients from regressing back transfers on transfers for
the diﬀerent groups, gives a clear picture. We see that the NGO types strongly discrim-
inate against No-NGO types. Regressing back transfer on transfer by trustor type gives
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent coeﬃcients for AI and WWF types than from No-NGO types (p<0.05,
F-Test, Regressions 7 and 8, Table 3). It is also the case that WWF types favor other WWF
types over AI types (p<0.05). This might be explained by the mere in-group eﬀect which is
present even when group formation is arbitrary as in the artist treatment. The lower half
of Figure 3 shows that there are small diﬀerences between the slopes for the diﬀerent artist
types. These diﬀerences are small, though, compared to the diﬀerence between the NGO
and the No-NGO group (Regressions 10-12, Table 3). All diﬀerences except for one (back
transfers to Kandinski and to No-Artist from Kandinski trustees) are insigniﬁcant (p>0.1,
F-tests). We also ﬁnd that No-NGO types do not discriminate between the trustor groups
(third panel in upper half of Figure 3 and Regression 9 in Table 3).
Table 3: Regressions of back transfers of diﬀerent groups on transfers from diﬀerent groups
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
WWF AI No NGO Klee Kand. No Art.
dependent variable in all models: back transfers
wwf[0,1] 1.00 -0.35 -0.12 klee[0,1] 0.58 0.0071 -0.40
(0.56) (0.33) (0.17) (0.47) (0.15) (0.24)
ai[0,1] 0.97 -0.050 -0.083 kandinski[0,1] -0.041 -0.21 -0.45∗
(0.53) (0.32) (0.19) (0.34) (0.20) (0.22)
no-ngo[0,1] 0.27 0.017 -0.063 no-artist[0,1] 0.012 0.050 -0.41
(0.33) (0.17) (0.21) (0.30) (0.14) (0.24)
transfer×wwf 1.02∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ transfer×klee 1.10∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.24) (0.13)
transfer×ai 0.88∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ transfer×kandinski 1.11∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) (0.22) (0.13)
transfer×no-ngo 0.50∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ transfer×no-artist 1.02∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.21) (0.25) (0.12)
푁 344 348 524 푁 204 168 432
푅2 0.37 0.48 0.37 푅2 0.65 0.65 0.69
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ 푝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 푝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 푝 < 0.001. In models (7)-(9) back transfers
from the diﬀerent NGO groups are regressed on the group dummies of the trustors and their transfers. Model
(7) refers to the upper left panel in Figure 3, model (8) to the upper middle panel and (9) to the upper right
panel. In models (10)-(12) back transfers from the diﬀerent artist groups are regressed on the group dummies
of the trustors and their transfers. Model (10) refers to the lower left panel, model (11) to the lower middle
panel and (12) to the lower right panel.
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The comparison of the behavior of the NGO types in the two treatments reveals a strong
negative discrimination against out-groups and no positive discrimination of in-groups. A
regression of back transfers from WWF or AI types on transfers from either group in the
mission treatment and from trustors in the minimal group treatment (the three artist groups
pooled), gives us four coeﬃcients (Regressions 13 and 14, Table 4). The coeﬃcient for a
transfer from an artist type is statistically not diﬀerent to the coeﬃcients for a transfer from
a WWF or from an AI type (p>0.1, F-tests). However, the slope coeﬃcient for a transfer
from a No-NGO type is signiﬁcantly smaller than the slope coeﬃcient for a transfer from
an artist type (p<0.05, F-test). This suggests that negative discrimination of out-group
subjects is the main driver of the diﬀerences in back transfers in the mission treatment.
Table 4: Regressions of back transfers from
NGO types on transfers from diﬀerent groups
in both treatments
(13) (14)
WWF AI
dep. variable: back transfers
wwf[0,1] 1.00 -0.35
(0.57) (0.34)
ai[0,1] 0.97 -0.05
(0.53) (0.32)
no-ngo[0,1] 0.27 0.02
(0.33) (0.17)
art[0,1] -0.49 0.43
(0.26) (0.29)
transfer×wwf 1.02∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.18)
transfer×ai 0.88∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16)
transfer×no-ngo 0.50∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15)
transfer×art[avg] 1.21∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
푁 344 348
푅2 0.62 0.66
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ 푝 < 0.05, ∗∗
푝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 푝 < 0.001. In the models (14) and (15)
back transfers from AI and WWF types, respectively,
in both treatments are the dependent variable.
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4 Conclusion
We ﬁnd that subjects who identify themselves with non-proﬁt missions are more trustworthy
if they interact with somebody with the same mission or if they interact in a neutral setting
in which they do not know the (potential) pro-social mission of their partner. Attracting such
individuals might be beneﬁcial for organizations in the non-proﬁt sector and possibly explain
diﬀerent compensation schemes, such as ﬁxed salaries, as compared to more performance
based remuneration schemes in for-proﬁt organizations (e.g., Ballou and Weisbrod 2003).
However, when the group identity of the organization is salient and there is an out-group
that does not share it, strong discrimination might result. Besley and Ghatak (2005) discuss
possible detrimental eﬀects on worker motivation if an organization hires a new principal who
is not dedicated to the organization’s mission. This would, for example, be the case if an NGO
hires a ﬁnancial expert who has gained no merits as an activist. Our results suggest that such
a mission mismatch might also be detrimental for trust inside the organization. They also
suggest that trust between groups with very diﬀerent goals, e.g., between an environmental
NGO and an industrial producer, might be very low. This would make cooperations between
them, e.g., in the context of a corporate social responsibility program, diﬃcult. It seems
that strong identiﬁcation with a good cause goes hand in hand with intolerance toward
out-groups.
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[Instructions to the Experiment] 
 
[Instructions for trustors; instructions for trustees were the same with switched roles and are 
therefore omitted here] 
 
 
Experiment: General Information for  Participant A 
 
 
You will now participate in a scientific experiment. 
 
If you carefully read the following instructions, you can earn money. How much money you will 
earn depends on your decisions and decisions of other participants in the experiment. It is, therefore, 
important to read the instructions carefully. 
 
Please, note that it is not permitted to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If 
you have questions, please, direct them at us. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment all participants receive a show-up fee of 10 CHF. During the 
course of the experiment you can earn points in addition to that. All points you earn are converted 
into Swiss Francs at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is: 
 
1 Point = 0.80 CHF. 
 
At the end you receive the income you have earned during the experiment plus the 10 CHF show-up 
fee in cash. You will be paid out in a separate room, so that no other participant can see how much 
you have earned.  
 
 
 
 
 
13
 The Experiment 
 
In this experiment there are always a participant A and  participant B together in a group of two. No 
participant knows the identity of the participant who is in her group, that is, all decisions are made 
anonymously. 
 
You are participant A. 
 
At the beginning, participants A and B receive 12 points. You, as participant A, can then transfer  0, 
4, 8, or 12  points to B. This transfer is tripled. If you transfer 4 points, for example, B receives 12 
points in addition to her endowment. If you transfer 12 points, for example, B receives 36 points. 
 
After you have made your decision participant B can transfer back any amount out of the points he 
disposes of to you. If you do not transfer zero points, for example, B can transfer 0 to 12 points back 
to you. In case you transfer your whole endowment of 12 points, B can transfer back between 0 and 
48 points back to you (12 3=36 plus 12 points endowment). The backtransfer is not tripled, that is, 
you receive exactly the amount of points B transfers back. 
 
The income of both participants is determined in dependence on your and B’s decisions as follows: 
 
 
You, as participant A, earn 
12 – Your transfer to B +Participant B’s backtransfer to you. 
 
 
Participant B earns 
12 + 3 Your transfer to B – B’s backtransfer to you  
 
 
 
For your transfer you can choose 0, 4, 8 or 12 Punkte wählen. For the backtransfer B can choose any 
integer amount of points (maximally the total points (s)he disposes of). 
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 WWF, Amnesty International or None of the two 
 
In this experiment you can make your transfer decision dependent on a certain information. Before 
the instructions were distributed all participants filled in a short questionnaire. Among other 
questions it contained a question regarding the identification with the goals of one of the NGOs 
WWF or Amnesty International. The answer options were WWF, Amnesty International or None 
of the two. The participant B you are matched with in this experiment has also answered this 
question. You can make your transfer decision dependent on B’s answer. 
 
This means that you you make a transfer decision for every possible answer of B. In total you 
make three decisisons. The decision screen looks as follows. 
 
 
 
 
This screen displays the case that B has indicated that (s)he identifies her/himself strongly with the 
goals of the WWF. Please, enter your transfer for this case in the blue field. Please, confirm your 
decision by pressing the okay button.  
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The other two screens for the case that B identifies her/himself strongly with the goals of Amnesty 
International and the case that (s)he does not strongly identify her/himself with either NGO look the 
same as the one above. The screen appear in  random order. 
 
Which of the three cases is relevant for your pay-off is determined by the actual answer of the 
participant B you are matched with in the experiment. You will be informed about this decision 
after all participants have made their decisions. 
 
Also participant B can make his/her backtransfer decisions to you dependent on how you have 
answered the question about the WWF and Amnesty International. 
 
After all participants have made their transfer decisions, the expermint is over. You will then be 
informed how the particant B you are matched with has answered the question. The answer 
determines which of your transfer decisions is relevant. At the same time you are informed about 
B’s backtransfer and the resulting pay-off to you. Your pay-off will then be paid out to you 
anonymously in cash, that is, the other participants do not get to know your pay-off. 
 
 
 
Control Questions 
 
Please, answer the following control questions. Your answers do not influence the pay-offs of the 
experiment but only serve to check whether everybody understands the experiment. When you have 
finished, please, raise your hand, so that we can check your answers. 
 
Question 1: You are Participant A. How many transfer decisions are you going to make in this 
experiment? 
 
Question 2: You are Participant A. What determines which of your decisions becomes relevant for 
the pay-offs? 
 
Question 3: You are Participant A. Assume, your pay-off relevant transfer to B is 0 points, and 
Participant B’s relevant backtransfer is also 0 points.  
 
What is your income? 
What is participant B’s income? 
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Question 4: You are Participant A. Assume, your pay-off relevant transfer to B is 12 points, and 
Participant B’s relevant backtransfer is also 12 points.  
 
What is your income? 
What is participant B’s income? 
 
Question 5: You are Participant A. Assume, your pay-off relevant transfer to B is 8 points, and 
Participant B’s relevant backtransfer is also 5 points.  
 
What is your income? 
What is participant B’s income? 
 
Do you have any questions? 
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